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I. Introduction
Two forces have restructured and reshaped the world since the late twentieth century: 
first is the prevailing wave of economic integration and globalization, reshaping the in-
ternational economic order; second is the third wave of democratization, redefining the 
international political order. The former proved the failure of state-planned economies, 
while the latter accelerated the collapse of one-party systems, military regimes, and 
personal dictatorships. As a consequence, the number of newly democratized countries 
has boomed since the beginning of the 1990s, and democratization and its consolida-
tion have become major topics of academic research.2 This prompts us to ask several 
questions. Why do representative governmental forms become the political system of 
choice? Why are such weak and imperfect political entities able to replace other re-
gimes? And, why does the wave of democratization proceed so quickly and extensive-
ly? These questions and our answers lead us to view democratization as an important 
aspect of contemporary globalization. 
According to the annual report Freedom in the World for 2004-2005, published by 
Freedom House, although there are 119 electoral democracies, and 89 liberal democra-
cies, about 2.3 billion people (37 percent of the world population) live in 49 countries 
classified in the report as Not Free.3 China is among those Not Free countries, and 
China’s 1.3 billion people make up substantially more than half (56.5%) of all people 
who live in the Not Free countries.4 Therefore, the question whether a fourth wave of 
democratization will transform China is a major concern for the rest of the world.5 And 
does the spread of democracy promise exemption from the fear of war? That is, does 
the spread of democracy promote world peace? 
When President Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan addressed the Asia-Pacific Democracy 
Cooperation Forum in August 2002, he said, “after the terrorist attacks of September 
11th, 2001, the Asia-Pacific region has become an important theater of international 
counter-terrorism activities. There are three major factors which could affect the suc-
cess of the counter-terrorism activities in this region, including the safety and stabil-
ity of the Asia-Pacific region, the consolidation and expansion of democracy in this 
region, and regional economic cooperation and development. Safety, democracy and 
economy may be regarded as three major anchors assuring peace and prosperity in the 
Asia-Pacific region. Among them, the consolidation and expansion of democracy is 
the pivotal factor which could lead to peace and robust economic development in Asia, 
1 Professor, Graduate Institute of Development Studies, National Chengchi University. 
2 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 
(Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 13-26, and Samuel P. 
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3 Freedom House, “Civic Power and Electoral Politics: A Report from Freedom House,” p. 
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and become a cornerstone of support for the universal values of global freedom and 
democracy. As the paragon of the third wave of Democratization, Taiwan is willing to 
cooperate with the advanced democracies, and to work together to strengthen the new 
democracies in East Asia, and especially to foster China’s democratization.”
In the present work, we first review the current wave of democratization under glo-
balization. Then we illustrate relations between democracy and the likeliness of war 
or peace. Thirdly, we narrate the process and experience of Taiwan’s democratization. 
Then we analyze the future prospect of China’s democratization and inquire whether 
Taiwan’s experience is an applicable model for China. Finally, we pursue the ques-
tion whether smooth and successful democratization in China would assure long-term 
peace and prosperity across the Taiwan Strait. 
II. The Wave of Democratization under Globalization
When we reflect on means to bring about integration of the third wave of democratiza-
tion, we notice that this global phenomenon bears a relationship with the progress of 
globalization. There are two schools of methodological thought on the observation and 
study of this relationship. The first views globalization as the subject of observation and 
study, while the second school treats globalization as the reference background against 
which other phenomena and interactions can be observed and studied.6 We could say 
that the first school adopts a stricter, more specific theory of globalization, while the 
second school embraces a more general theory of globalization. Innumerable aspects 
of globalization have been studied in detail by others, and it is not the object of the 
present work to embroider additional details into that body of research. Therefore in 
the present work, we adopt the approach of the second school, and treat globalization 
as the background against which to observe and discuss relations between the trends of 
globalization and democratization.
1. Globalization and Democratization
Since the onset of the twenty-first century, two important trends have received much 
attention: globalization and democratization. The present trend of globalization has 
taught us that political history is a process of continuous democratization; that de-
mocratization can eliminate violence and inhumanity; and that democratization can 
eliminate inequalities and social classes. Globalization is an important phase in the 
development of political history, but what, if anything, does globalization do to lay a 
foundation for the realization of democracy? Broadly speaking, the following labels 
are used to identify three different viewpoints on global democratization: (1) liberal-
internationalism; (2) radical-republicanism; and (3) cosmopolitan democracy.7 
Although we treat globalization as reference background, it must be noticed that 
globalization influences nearly everything in our daily lives. In order to explain the 
third wave of democratization, we have to clarify the relationship between globaliza-
tion and democratization. Previous studies have concluded that although globalization 
and democratization both have long, complicated histories, they do connect, and do 
reinforce each other. In other words, globalization furthers democratization, and vice 
versa.8 If the world is to be dominated by a single ideology, it might best be globaliza-
tion, because the Cold War era taught us that when democratization is incomplete, the 
6 David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Glodblatt, and Jonathan Perraton , Global 
Transformations : Politics, Economics and Culture (Oxford: Polity Press, 1999), pp. 2-12.
7 Held, McGrew, Glodblatt, and Perraton , Global Transformations, pp. 447-450.
8 Marc F. Plattner, “Globalization and Self-Government,” Journal and Democracy, vol. 13, 
no. 3 (July 2002), p. 54.
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democratic and non-democratic countries tend to form blocs that actively confront one 
another. In order for democracy to maintain its relevance, effectiveness, and legitimacy 
in the future, it is critically important that we learn to deepen and spread democracy 
without such confrontations.9 
2. The Third Wave of Democratization
In The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Samuel P. 
Huntington pointed out three waves of democratization. The first wave occurred be-
tween 1800 and 1930. After WWI, democratic systems spread extensively. There were 
about 32 liberal democracies in 1922. But twenty years later, due to the rise of fascism, 
only twelve democracies survived. The second wave of democratization appeared fol-
lowing the end of WWII. This wave reached an apex in the 1950s, and declined during 
the 1970s. We are now seeing the third wave of democratization.10 The following ta-
bles, based on the annual reports of Freedom House, provide the data and we use the de-
sign of Larry Diamond11 to demonstrate progress of the third wave of democratization.
Table 1: Rise of Electoral Democracies (1974, 1990-2005)
Year Number of Democratic 
Countries
Total Number of Countries in 
the World
Percentage of Democracies Increasing Rate of 
Democracies
1974 39 142 27.5% n/a
1990 76 165 46.1% n/a
1991 91 183 49.7% 19.7%
1992 99 186 53.2% 8.1%
1993 108 190 56.8% 8.3%
1994 114 191 59.7% 5.3%
1995 117 191 61.3% 2.6%
1996 118 191 61.8% 0.9%
1997 117 191 61.3% -0.9%
1998 117 191 61.3% 0.0%
1999 120 192 62.5% 2.5%
2000 120 192 62.5% 0.0%
2001 121 192 63.0% 0.8%
2002 121 192 63.0% 0.0%
2003 121 192 63.0% 0.0%
2004 117 192 61.0% -3.3%
2005 119 192 62.0% 1.7%
Source: 1. Raymond D.Gastil ed., Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1988-89 
(New York: Freedom House, 1989); 2. Freedom House, Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political 
Rights and Civil Liberties, 1990-2005 (New York: Freedom House, 1991-2005); 3. Adrian Karatnycky, 
“Muslim Countries and the Democracy Gap,” Journal of Democracy,” Vol. 13, No. 1 (January 2002), pp. 99-
112; 4. Adrian Karatnycky, “The 30th Anniversary Freedom House Survey: Liberty’s Advances in a Troubled 
World,” Journal of Democracy, Vol.14, No.1 (January 2003), pp.100-113; 5. Larry Diamond, “The End of 
the Third Wave and the Start of the Fourth,” in Marc F. Plattner and Joao Carlos Espada eds., The Democratic 
Invention (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), pp.13-33; and 6. The statisti-
cal number of electoral democracies in 1974 was estimated by Larry Diamond.
9 David Held, Models of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp. 359-360.
10 Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 13-30.
11 Diamond, “The End of the Third Wave and the Start of the Fourth,” pp. 14-18.
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Table 2: Global Trend Toward Freedom (1972-2004)
Year Free (%) Partly Free (%) Not Free (%) Total
1972 42（29.0%） 36（24.8%） 67（46.2%） 145
1980 52（31.9%） 52（31.9%） 59（36.2%） 163
1985 56（33.5%） 56（33.5%） 55（32.9%） 167
1990 65（39.4%） 50（30.3%） 50（30.3%） 165
1991 76（41.5%） 65（35.5%） 42（22.9%） 183
1992 75（40.3%） 73（39.2%） 38（20.4%） 186
1993 72（37.9%） 63（33.2%） 55（28.9%） 190
1994 76（39.8%） 61（31.9%） 54（28.3%） 191
1995 76（39.8%） 62（32.5%） 53（27.7%） 191
1996 79（41.4%） 59（31.1%） 53（27.7%） 191
1997 81（42.4%） 57（29.8%） 53（27.2%） 191
1998 88（46.1%） 53（27.2%） 50（26.2%） 191
1999 85（44.3%） 59（30.7%） 48（25.0%） 192
2000 85（44.3%） 60（31.3%） 47（24.4%） 192
2001 86（44.7%） 57（29.8%） 49（25.5%） 192
2002 89（46.4%） 56（29.2%） 47（24.4%） 192
2003 89（46.4%） 55（28.6%） 48（25.0%） 192
2004 88（45.8%） 55（28.6%） 49（25.5％） 192
2005 89（46.4%） 54（28.1%） 49（25.5%） 192
Source: See Table 1.
The Spanish Revolution if 1974 commenced the third wave of democratization. At 
that time, there were only 39 “electoral democracies” in the world, accounting for just 
27.5% of the world’s 142 countries. By 1990, the number of electoral democracies had 
rapidly increased to 76, accounting for 46.1% of the 165 countries in the world. As to 
liberal democracies, although scholars have applied different statistical measures, the 
number of “liberal democracies” increased from 42 (29.0%) in 1972 to 65 (39.4%) in 
1990. Like the electoral democracies, the number of liberal democracies also increased 
quite rapidly (see Table 1 and Table 2). 
In 1990 the number of liberal democracies accounted for 85.5% of all electoral de-
mocracies. Then there was a relative stagnation of liberal democracies in the early 1990s 
in which the number of electoral democracies increased but the number of liberal de-
mocracies did not.12 The picture changed after 1996. In 1996, the number of liberal de-
mocracies accounted for 67.0% of 118 electoral democracies. In the following years, the 
number of electoral democracies showed a small increase to 120 or 121. But the number 
of liberal democracies decreased over the same period to 85 or 86. In 2002, although the 
number of electoral democracies remained unchanged, and the number of liberal democ-
racies increased to 89 (3.4% growth), it appeared that the third wave of democratization 
was reaching its end (see Table 3). Scholars have recently begun to focus their watch 
for signs of increasing democracy13 on the Islamic Arabian countries and China, to see 
whether they can discern the beginnings of a fourth wave of democratization.14 
12 Diamond, “The End of the Third Wave and the Start of the Fourth,” p. 19.
13 Aleksander Smolar, “History and Memory: The Revolution of 1989-91,” Journal of Democracy, 
vol. 12, no. 1 (January 2001), p. 5; and Yeau-tarn Lee, “Can the Fourth Wave of Democratization Happen 
in China?” Policy News Forum, no. 25 (April 19, 2002), [Online, cited 18 August 2005]. Available from 
<http://www.socialsciences.nccu.edu.tw/society/composition/020419/pol_g_020419_b.htm>
14 Diamond, “The End of the Third Wave and the Start of the Fourth,” pp. 24, 28; Adrian Karatnycky, 
“Muslim Countries and the Democracy Gap,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 13, no. 1 (January 2002), pp. 
99-112; and Adrian Karatnycky, “The 30th Anniversary Freedom House Survey: Liberty’s Advances in 
a Troubled World,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no. 1 (January 2003), pp. 100-113.
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Table 3: Electoral Democracies and Liberal Democracies (1990-2005)
Year Electoral 
Democracies (N, %)
Liberal Democracies 
(N, %)
Percentage of Liberal 
Democracies in Electoral 
Democracies (%)
Total
1990 76（46.1%） 65（39.4%） 85.5% 165
1991 91（49.7%） 76（41.5%） 83.5% 183
1992 99（53.2%） 75（40.3%） 75.8% 186
1993 108（56.8%） 72（37.9%） 66.7% 190
1994 114（59.7%） 76（39.8%） 66.7% 191
1995 117（61.3%） 76（39.8%） 65.0% 191
1996 118（61.8%） 79（41.4%） 67.0% 191
1997 117（61.3%） 81（42.4%） 69.2% 191
1998 117（61.3%） 88（46.1%） 75.2% 191
1999 120（62.5%） 85（44.3%） 70.8% 192
2000 120（62.5%） 85（44.3%） 70.8% 192
2001 121（63.0%） 86（44.7%） 71.1% 192
2002 121（63.0%） 89（46.4%） 73.6% 192
2003 121（63.0%） 89（46.3%） 73.6% 192
2004 117（60.9%） 88（45.8%） 75.2% 192
2005 119（62.0%） 89（46.3%） 74.8% 192
Source: See Table 1.
Table 4 compares the years 1972 and 1975 by regional analyses of countries in dif-
ferent categories as to freedom. As the table shows, the percentage of free countries in 
the Americas increased by 18.6%; the percentage of free countries in the Western Europe 
increased by 24.0%; the percentage of free countries in Asia Pacific increased by 18.6%; 
the percentage of free countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union 
increased by 44.4%; the percentage of free countries in Sub-Saharan Africa increased by 
17.8%; and the percentage of free countries in Middle East and North Africa decreased 
by 4.9%. The percentage of free countries in the whole world increased by 17.6%. As 
Huntington argued in his comparative studies of democratization, democratic ideology has 
spread to different countries, regions, and cultural groups. The spread of democratization 
may be seen as the result of influence transmitted from one political system to another.15 
This prompts us to argue that the wave of democratization is an important aspect of glo-
balization, and the progress of globalization also promotes the spread of democratization.
Table 4: Freedom by Region (1972 and 2005)
Country Status/ 
Year
Region
Free Partly Free Not Free
1972 2005 1972 2005 1972 2005
Whole World 28.7% 46.3% 25.3% 28.1% 46.0% 25.5%
The Americas 50.0% 68.6% 34.6% 25.7% 15.4% 5.7%
Western Europe 72.0% 96.0% 16.0% 4.0% 12.0% 0.0%
Asia Pacific 25.0% 43.6% 46.0% 28.2% 34.4% 28.2%
CEE and FSU 0.0% 44.4% 0.0% 25.9% 100.0% 29.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.1% 22.9% 23.1% 43.8% 71.8% 33.3%
Middle East and North 
Africa
10.5% 5.6% 15.8% 27.8% 73.7% 66.7%
Source: Adrian Karatnycky, “The 30th Anniversary Freedom House Survey: Liberty’s Advances in 
a Troubled World,” Journal of Democracy, Vol.14, No.1 (January 2003), p.104; and Freedom House 
“Freedom in the World 2005: Selective Data from Freedom House’s Annual Global Survey of Political 
Rights and Civil Liberties,” [Online, cited 18 August 2005]. Available from <http://www.freedomhouse.
org/research/freeworld/2005/charts2005.pdf>
15 Held, McGrew, Glodblatt, and Perraton , Global Transformations, p. 451, and Landman, 
Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics, p. 218.
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III. Democracy, Democratization, War, and Peace
One of the most important contributions of modern social science is the finding that democ-
racies do not fight with one another.16 The relations between democracy and peace have 
been studied mainly by scholars of international relations. Subsequent to the third wave of 
democratization, researchers in the fields of comparative politics and international politics 
have also given more attention to the relations among democratization, war, and peace.17 
Democracy and Peace
The theoretical foundation predicting that democracy leads to peace is attributed 
Immanuel Kant. In his 1795 essay “Perpetual Peace,” Kant argued that countries have 
the natural inclination to become liberal republics. Such regimes not only provide politi-
cal leaders with legitimacy, but also foster unified citizen support in the face of foreign 
threats. Democratic governments are controlled by their citizens, and so are disinclined to 
engage in conflicts that will lead to civilian injuries and death. Once the liberal republican 
democracies are in place, the state of peace follows.18 Kant pointed out that peace among 
democracies has three main foundations: first, democracies have the culture to solve dis-
putes peacefully; secondly, democracies share the same moral foundation; and thirdly, the 
economic cooperation among democracies moves toward mutual benefit.19 (See Figure 1) 
Although experience teaches us that democracies have the same inclination toward 
war as is found among other regime types, experience also teaches us that democra-
cies will not fight with each other.20 Moreover, the fact that there have been no wars 
among democracies also points to some defining features of democracy.21 The liberal 
thought that characterizes liberal democracies certainly discourages them from war, 
but it also leads democracies to fight with non-democratic regimes. Liberal ideologies 
do not only assure individual freedoms, but also promote government operations and 
foreign policies that are conducive to peace. Due to their common ideology, liberal 
democracies tend to trust each other and believe that their differences can be resolved 
without war. However, they sometimes do have to confront non-democracies militari-
ly.22 Democracies seldom start invasive wars. On the other hand, most democracies 
16 Edward D. Mansfiled and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” 
International Security, vol. 13, no. 1 (Summer 1995), p. 5.
17 Georg Sorensen, Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing 
World 2nd ed. (Oxford: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 93-120; William R. Thompson, and Richard 
Tucker, “A Tale of Two Democratic Peace Critiques,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 41, 
No. 3 (June 1997), pp. 428-451; Michael D. Ward, and Kristian S. Gleditsch, “Democratizing 
for Peace,” American Political Science Review, vol. 41, No. 3 (March 1998), p. 52.
18 Reiss Hans ed., Kant: Political Writing (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 100.
19 Sorensen, Democracy and Democratization, pp. 95-96, 114-115. 
20 See Melvin Small, and David Singer, “The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes,” The Jerusalem 
Journal of International Relations, vol. 1, no. 4 (Summer 1976), pp. 50-69; Steve Chan, “Mirror, Mirror 
on the Wall…Are the Freer Countries More Pacific?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 28, no. 4 
(December 1984), pp. 617-648; Nils P. Gleditsch and Havard Herge, “Peace and Democracy,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, vol. 41, no. 2 (April 1997), p. 305; Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, “Normative and 
Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986,” American Political Science Review, vol. 87, no. 3 
(September 1993), p. 624; and Arvid Raknerud and Havard Herge, “The Hazard of War: Reassessing the 
Evidence for the Democratic Peace,” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 34, no. 4 (November 1997), p. 385.
21 See John M. Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” International Security, 
vol. 19, no. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125.
22 Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace;” John MacMillan, “Liberalism and the 
Democratic Peace,” Review of International Studies, no. 30 (2004), pp. 179-200; and Michael W. Doyle, 
“Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review, vol. 80, no. 4 (1986), p. 1161.
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give much attention to their own national interests, and also try to maintain consistency 
and balance with other each other. Although democratic governments are not generally 
pacifistic, we expect the world to become more peaceful as the number of democracies 
increases.23 
Figure 1: Kant’s Three Elements for Democratic Alliance
The First Element
The democratic norm to solve conflicts peacefully.
The Second Element
Democracies share the same morality.
The Third Element
The economic cooperation among democracies: relations of interdependence.
Source: Georg Sorensen, Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a 
Changing World. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 95-96.
1. Democratization and War
Since 1995, scholars have made much use of statistical methods to analyze the rela-
tions among democratization, war, and peace, and have achieved some insights worthy 
of further study. Examples of such studies are:
(1) Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder coauthored a 1995 essay titled 
“Democratization and the Danger of War.”24 They argued that countries would never 
achieve mature democracy. On the contrary, when countries are in the phase of 
democratic transition, they are more inclined to wage wars than other advanced 
democracies or stable autocratic governments. According to their argument, coun-
tries experiencing democratic reverses are more dangerous than countries without 
democracy.25 Based on a tabulation of data for all wars over the period from 1811 to 
1980, Mansfield and Snyder argued that it is difficult to promote peace by expand-
ing democracy. International society should not emphasize democratization alone. It 
is rather more important to help other countries to find better ways to transform their 
non-democratic regimes smoothly. For any country in the process of democratic 
transition, it is most critical to promote a free and competitive market, so that differ-
ent opinions may be expressed without oppression. The international environment is 
also an important factor. Only in a liberal international atmosphere can democratiz-
ing countries successfully complete the transition.26 
(2) Nils Peter Gleditsch and Harvard Herge used three levels of relationship (between 
two countries, among countries, and international system) to statistically analyze the 
relations between democracy and peace over the period from 1816 to 1994. They 
argued that deeper democratization could lower the probability of war. Although 
participation in wars might weaken the foundation of democracy in the short term, 
it could encourage establishment of more democracies in the long run, and ulti-
mately assure the prospect of democratic peace. Of course, if warfare were the main 
23 Dina A. Zinnes used propositional calculus to provide a logical construction to explain the 
empirical result why two democracies do not to go to war.  See Dina A. Zinnes, “Constructing 
Political Logic: the Democratic Peace Puzzle,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 48, no. 3 
(June 2004), pp. 430-454.
24 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” 
International Security, vol. 20, no. 1 (1995), pp. 5-38.
25 See Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” p. 6.
26 Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” pp. 36-38.
57
strategy for advancing democratization, a temporary turbulent period would be un-
avoidable.27 
(3) In a 1998 study, Micheal D. Ward and Kristian S. Gleditsch compared many coun-
try samples and examined the relations between democratization and international 
wars. They found that arduous and unstable democratic transition increases the 
probability of war, but democratic transition itself is not the reason for war.28 In 
other words, although stable and secure democracies will not fight with each other, 
the possibility of war increases when the process of democratic transition is not 
smooth and when reverses occur.29 
(4) Based on their own quantitative studies and the prior literature of democratization, 
Mark J.C. Crescenzi and Andrew J. Enterline discussed relations among the ratio of 
democracies, democratization, and war. They pointed out that when compared with 
the whole of international society, the number of democracies in a given region is 
insufficient, then there is positive relation between democratization and war in that 
region. In other words, although there is a relationship among democracy, democra-
tization, and war, each region has its own uniqueness. More region-specific studies 
are needed in order to better understand the relationship.30 
(5) Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder coauthored an essay in 2002, entitled 
“Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength and War.”31 They first argued that 
the 1990s was a period full of confrontations between democratization and national-
ism. This kind of confrontation could be seen not only within countries undergoing 
democratic transition, but also between those countries. The authors argued that new 
democracies are neither free nor peaceful. The former Yugoslavia, Caucasia, and 
Indonesia are the examples. Their transformations from autocratic regimes were not 
peaceful. On the contrary, there were nationalist movements seeking independence, 
which ultimately evolved into international affairs. And there were military conflicts 
between such countries. The boundary war between Ethiopia and Eritrea over the 
period 1998 to 2000 provides an example. The elected governments of India and 
Pakistan warred with each other in 1999 over the disputed Kashmir region. Another 
example is provided by the 1999 territorial conflicts between Peru and Ecuador, 
which began their democratic transitions in the 1980s and 1990s. Mansfield and 
Snyder concluded that “those countries experiencing democratic transition in fact 
are more inclined to wage wars with their neighbor countries than those autocratic 
countries.”32 Generally speaking, this is because elites in those countries often try to 
acquire public support and avoid political accountability, by resorting to national-
ism.33 The authors suggest that in order to contain such tendencies of politicians and 
other actors, it is necessary to enhance central government power during democratic 
27 Gleditsch and Herge, “Peace and Democracy,” pp. 283-310.
28 Ward, and Gleditsch, “Democratizing for Peace,” p. 53; and Landman, Issues and Methods 
in Comparative Politics, p. 218..
29 Ward, and Gleditsch, “Democratizing for Peace,” pp. 53, 60.
30 Mark J.C. Crescenzi and Andrew J. Enterline, “Ripples from the Waves? A Systemic, 
Time-Series Analysis of Democracy, Democratization, and Interstate War,” Journal of Peace 
Research, vol. 36, no. 1 (January 1999), pp. 75-94.
31 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength 
and War,” International Organization, vol. 56, no. 2 (Spring 2002), pp. 297-337.
32 Bill Kissane, “Democratization, State Formation, And Civil War in Finland and Ireland: A 
Reflection on the Democratic Peace Hypothesis,” Comparative Political Studies, vol. 37, no. 8 
(October 2004), pp. 969-985.
33 Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength and War,” pp. 297-298.
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transitions. Before asking those countries to hold fair and competitive national elec-
tions, international society should encourage and help those countries to establish 
rule of law, a just legal system, an election committee, professional and independent 
media, and a capable and well-trained civil service system.34 
These studies indicate that the theoretical democratic peace will prevail only when 
countries in democratic transition advance into the stage of democratic consolidation. 
The earlier stages of democratization will not necessarily lead to wars, but an unstable 
transition surely increases the possibility of war. Consolidated democracies are unlike-
ly to fight with one another, but the chance of war increases when there is any setback 
or reverse during a democratic transition. All democratic countries, as a community of 
international society, share the obligation to provide the resources and assistance need-
ed by those countries undergoing democratic transition, in order minimize reverses and 
resulting hostile outbreaks.
IV. The Processes and Experience of Taiwan’s Democratization
According to Freedom House, Taiwan has made significant strides in political and civil 
liberties in the past thirty years. In 1972 Taiwan was rated as undemocratic, with politi-
cal rights scored as 6 on a scale of 7 in which a score of 1 was most democratic; civil 
liberties in Taiwan were scored as 5. Taiwan was considered “partly free” by Freedom 
House for the first time in its 1976 survey, with a political rights score of 5. During the 
subsequent years, political liberalism in Taiwan was advanced by a series of opening 
up and liberalizing measures including the grant of very broad press freedom, the right 
to form opposition political parties, and allowing travel to Mainland China for family 
visits. In the 1990 Freedom House survey, Taiwan’s ratings for political rights and civil 
liberties both rose to a score of 3, but Taiwan was still categorized as “partly free.” 
Taiwan’s first direct presidential election, in March 1996, marked a giant leap for its 
democracy. Open and fair elections being held regularly at all levels of government, 
and people’s political rights being well protected, Taiwan was then listed by Freedom 
House among the countries practicing both electoral and liberal democracy. 
The essence of democratic politics is that people have the right to elect their leaders 
in regular, public, fair, and free national elections. The 1996 presidential election was 
thus the key to Taiwan’s democratization, and also a milestone in Taiwan’s democratic 
politics.35 After Taiwan’s second direct presidential election, in 2000, Taiwan peace-
fully passed from government by an entrenched quasi-Leninist party-state system over 
to government by the opposition Democratic Progressive Party, a party widely per-
ceived as pursuing a new identity and a new direction for the future. Taiwan not only 
surpassed Russia, Brazil, and other “electoral democracies” in the progress of democra-
tization, according to the Freedom House survey, but Taiwan was recognized together 
with Japan as the most liberal country in Asia (average score was 1.5), surpassing South 
Korea and the Philippines, both of which started democratization earlier than Taiwan.36 
In the 2002 report of Freedom House, Taiwan, South Korea, and Thailand not only 
have had remarkable economic development, but these three countries also broadened 
34  Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength and War,” p. 334.
35 Adrian Karatnycky, “Freedom on the March,” Freedom Review, vol. 28, no. 1 (January/
February 1997), pp. 6-8; Yeau-tarn Lee, “Toward Consolidated Democracy: Taiwan Case,” 
Journal of Social Science, vol. 5, no. 2 (June 1997), p. 171; and Yeau-tarn Lee, “Explaining the 
Experience of Taiwan’s Democratic Transition from the Related Concepts of Democratization,” 
Chinese Political Science Review, no. 29 (December 1997), pp. 160-168. 
36 Adrian Karatnycky, Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties (New York: 
Freedom House, 2002), pp. 108-109.
59
the scope of their people’s political rights and civil liberties. This result challenged the 
concept of so-called “Asian Values,” which holds that economic development in Asia 
must link up with authoritarian regimes.37 
1. The Phases of Taiwan’s Democratic Transition
Dankwart A. Rustow in 1970 proposed a model to explain the phases of demo-
cratic transition, and Georg Sorensen modified it in 1998, to illustrate the factors lead-
ing to each phase of democratization (See Figure 2).38 This model starts with a single 
background condition, national unity, and postulates a sequence of three phases that 
non-democratic systems undergo during transition to democracy. In the real world, the 
enumerated phases usually overlap one another. The first phase of democratic transition 
is a “preparatory phase,” a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle leading to the 
collapse of a non-democratic regime. The second phase is a “decision phase” in which a 
decision to establish a democratic order emerges and is implemented. The third phase is 
a “consolidation phase” in which the new democracy undergoes further development, 
and democratic habits become ingrained in the political culture.39 
Figure 2: Model of Democratic Transition
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Source: Georg Sorensen, Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a 
Changing World. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Westview Press, 1998), p. 40.
In the ongoing process of Taiwan’s political development, liberalization and de-
mocratization are two different but closely linked phases.40 The gradual progress of 
economic and political liberalization brings about democratization, and this liberaliza-
37 Adrian Karatnycky, Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties (New York: 
Freedom House, 2003), p. 103.  Also, Taiwan has completed its political progress with admirable 
economic growth.  See Adrian Karatnycky, “The 2003 Freedom House Survey: National Income 
and Liberty,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 15, no. 1 (January 2004), p. 85.
38 Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy,” Comparative Politics, vol. 2, no. 3 
(April 1970), pp. 350-361; and Sorensen, Democracy and Democratization, p. 40.
39 Sorensen, Democracy and Democratization, pp. 40, 45.
40 See Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore and London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 1-78; and Scott Mainwaring, “Transitions to Democracy 
and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and Comparative issues, ” in Scott Mainwaring, 
Guillermo O’Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela ed., Issues in Democratic Consolidation 
(Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), p. 298.
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tion also calls for deeper democratization, which encourages the growth of democratic 
politics.41 For this reason, if we apply Rustow’s model to explain Taiwan’s progress, we 
can readily see that Taiwan began its liberalization with the establishment of the opposi-
tion Democratic Progressive Party in 1986, or the abolition of Martial Law in 1987, by 
declaration of then President Chiang Ching-Kuo. Then Taiwan had comprehensive elec-
tions for its national legislature in 1991 and 1992, which linked the process of democra-
tization, and a direct popular presidential election in 1996, which realized democratiza-
tion. Taiwan not only successfully completed the task of democratic transition by these 
events, but then in the 2000 election turned over government power, from the fifty-year 
KMT regime, to the former opposition Democratic Progressive Party. Although Taiwan 
has completed the preparatory and decision phases, and has stepped into the early stages 
of its consolidation phase, full consolidation is not yet achieved: democratic regulations, 
norms, and habits have not yet fully integrated into each stratum of Taiwan society.42 
2. The Achievements of Taiwan’s Democratic Transition
The onset of Taiwan’s democratic transition was marked by the collapse of authori-
tarianism and the rise of a democratic wave. Although the democratic transition did 
not lead to a sudden crash of the former authoritarian regime, it is fortunate that the 
change also did not produce serious economic recession, social turmoil, or political 
struggle. The process of Taiwan’s democratic transition could be seen as a “peaceful 
revolution.”43 We summarize distinctive characteristics of Taiwan’s democratization 
as follows: (1) Taiwan’s process of democratic transition was not a typical democratic 
metamorphosis; (2) Taiwan’s democratic transition was not the transformation from a 
military government to a democratic one – the former regime was a one-party state; (3) 
there were no serious economic or political crises during Taiwan’s democratic transi-
tion, and neither were there any popular movements for economic and political reform; 
(4) there were cleavages and conflicts between different clans urging different political 
localization; (5) the public questioned the government’s legality and legitimacy during 
the democratic transition; (6) reform advocates within the former ruling party took the 
initiative to negotiate with the moderate faction of the rising opposition party, which 
provided a negotiation channel for democratization.44 The resulting relatively rational 
and nonviolent negotiation was a particularly remarkable feature of Taiwan’s demo-
cratic transition. 
According to Larry Diamond, among some one hundred countries that have begun 
democratic transitions, less than 20 have succeeded.45 Among the successes, Taiwan 
41 Mahmood Monshipouri, Democratization, Liberalization & Human Rights in the Third 
World (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p. 16.
42 See Robert Dahl, On Democracy (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1998)., pp. 157-158. 
Also see Yeau-tarn Lee and Hsiao-ping Chang, “The Analysis of Taiwan’s Democratization: 
Rustow’s and Huntington’s Models Applied,” Journal of Social Science, vol. 10, no. 2 
(December 2002), p. 68. 
43 Ming Rang, Democracy in Taiwan (Taipei: Yuan-Liou Publishing Co., Ltd, 2000), pp. 
30-33.
44 There are three types of democratization: transformation (started by ruling elites), 
replacement (started by opposition forces which causes the collapse of existed authoritarian 
regime), and transplacement (government cooperates with opposition forces).  See Huntington, 
The Third Wave, pp. 114-163.  Also see Yeau-tarn Lee, “Explaining the Experience of Taiwan’s 
Democratic Transition from the Related Concepts of Democratization,” Chinese Political 
Science Review, no. 29, p. 175.
45 Larry Diamond, “Is the Third Wave Over?” Journal of Democracy, vol. 7, no. 3 (July 
1996), pp. 20-37.
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is the only one in East Asia. Compared with the Philippines and South Korea, Taiwan’s 
democratization progressed much more rapidly. Although there were challenges during 
the democratic transitions in all three of these countries, they all strived and overcame 
the challenges, and finally become models of democratic transition.46 In Taiwan, the 
second turnover of the “two turnover test,” ultimately demonstrating smooth operation 
of the democratic system, still lies ahead. It is the second turnover that finally imprints 
democracy into the consciousness of the electorate.47 In Diamond’s view, Taiwan is 
equally as free as the advanced democracies in Britain, France, Japan, Germany, and 
Italy. Nonetheless, Taiwan’s major challenge in moving toward an advanced democ-
racy at this time is learning how to jump start its consolidation phase.48 
V. The Prospect of China’s Democratization
When we describe the phenomenon that is the global spread of democracy, it is impor-
tant to notice the following questions: How do we explain the possibility and probabil-
ity of democratization? How are democratic regimes established and maintained? Is 
there any objective prerequisite for democratization? As to countries in the third wave 
of democratization, why did these previously authoritarian countries transform at last 
into democracies?49 Huntington sees the number of newly established democracies in 
the third wave of democratization as being unprecedented in world history.50 His com-
parative analysis of global democratization tries to explain why and how these coun-
tries chose democratization. Huntington’s studies might provide useful guidance when 
we seek to estimate the probability of democratization in China.
1. Causes of the Wave of Democratization
Huntington proposed five factors as particular inducements to democratization: (1) 
the legitimacy crises of authoritarian regimes, which often exhibit a long, gradual on-
set; (2) substantial economic development, particularly with high economic growth 
rates during the 1960s; (3) religious or cultural transitions, such as the notable changes 
of activities and creeds in western Catholicism, as well as departures from the tradi-
tional norms of eastern Confucian society; (4) influence from external forces, such as 
policy changes in important other countries; (5) the snowballing effect of successful 
examples of democratic transitions in other countries.51 
Huntington regarded legitimacy crises as an “ambiguous concept that political 
analysts want to avoid; but it is absolutely necessary for understanding the problems 
that authoritarian regimes have to face in the end of 20th century.” On one hand, 
Huntington asserted that there is no consequential relation between economic devel-
opment and democratization, but on the other hand, he also seems to recognize that 
the two bear at least a temporal relationship: the power of an authoritarian regime 
will be diminished during periods of fast economic growth or periods of economic 
recession.52 
Huntington argued that some 75 percent of the democracies newly established in the 
46 Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 13, 
no. 1 (January 2002), pp. 5-21.
47 Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 266-267.
48 Yeau-tarn Lee, “Toward Consolidated Democracy: Taiwan Case,” pp. 43-65.
49 Daniel H. Levine, “Paradigm Lost: Dependency to Democracy,” World Politics, no. 2 
(April 1988), pp. 377-394; and Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991).
50 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 26.
51 Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 45-46.
52 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 59.
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third wave of democratization in the 1990s were Catholic countries, and he attributed that 
fact to pro-democracy pressure exerted by the Church upon the former authoritarian re-
gimes.53 He pointed out that each major culture, including Asian Confucianism, has some 
elements congruent with democracy. Although “Confucian democracy” might sound like 
a paradoxical phrase, democracy could reasonably thrive within a Confucian society.54 
Huntington also noticed that establishment of the EU, the policies adopted by the Carter 
and Reagan administrations, and the economic liberalization and political reform poli-
cies adopted by Gorbachev all might have contributed to the emergence of democratiza-
tion.55 Huntington observed that the attention of the global media produced a vast and far-
reaching demonstration effect. This demonstration effect was most powerful in countries 
neighboring the new democracies or having similar cultures.56 Thus it is clear that democ-
ratization does not a result from one single factor. Notwithstanding that qualitative global 
research is subject to some analytical restraints, it does point out some useful directions 
that we could follow in a search for indications of a prospective democratization in China.57 
The following viewpoints on the prospect or foreseeable possibility of democratiza-
tion in China are motivated by the above reasoning and the five factors in Huntington’s 
theory on the third wave of democratization:
(1) In the aspect of economic development, Catholicism, and Confucianism: Rapid 
economic growth inevitably challenges China’s authoritarian regime, but it is 
equally certain that such growth not assure the establishment of democratic system. 
On the contrary, it is likely that Chinese leaders would root out emerging opposition 
factions in order to strengthen the Communist position. China has never been oc-
cupied or colonized by the United States, and Christianity has no strong power, not 
to mention that the Catholic power hardly exists in China. However, the religious 
issue which is worthy of our attention is the issue of Falun Gong. Although the 
traditional culture within the Confucian society will be preserved, and democratic 
thought from Western society will have some influence, it is the belief of China’s 
current leaders that authoritarianism is the highest guiding principle if China wants 
to obtain a balance between the pursuit of economic growth and the avoidance of 
disorderliness. 
(2) In the aspect of policies adopted by foreign countries, and the demonstration effect: 
the United States is devoted to advocating democratic systems, but its effort has 
been criticized by an authoritarian China. China has argued that the US not only 
interference in its internal affairs, but also intends an imperialist invasion. Although 
there is not enough evidence to make a proof of the matter, we believe that the 
examples of the collapse of the Marcos regime in the Philippines in 1986 and the 
democracy advocacy of Cardinal Kim Sou-hwan in South Korea during the same 
year did have a demonstration effect that encouraged the democratic movements in 
China during the autumn of 1986.
(3) In the aspect of legitimacy crisis: The Chinese Communist Party has advocated for 
authoritarianism by proletarian class, and despised the Western type of liberal democ-
racy. The CCP argues that this type of democracy is capitalist class democracy. To be 
more specific, there is no democratic element in China’s totalitarian ideology and it 
is also proclaimed in its constitution that the CCP leads and rules China. Therefore, if 
China wants to adopt a democratic system, the one-party dictatorship should be first 
53 Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 76, 79-85.
54 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 310.
55 Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 85-100.
56 Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 101-106.
57 Landman, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics, pp. 146-147.
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abolished. But Chinese Communist leaders firmly deny any decline of legitimacy 
of their regime, and any legitimacy challenge by the people is met with force and 
violence. This kind of crises always happens when there are changes in the leading 
cadres. The Tiananmen Massacre of June 4, 1989 provides the best example.58 
China’s communist leadership believe that if they have consensus on means for con-
trolling the populace, then they can maintain control in spite of any crisis of legitimacy. 
Such control of the populace inhibits and possibly precludes any democratization, even 
in the face of a legitimacy crisis or regime crisis in China.
2. Taiwan Model
Whether China will be democratized in the future is now an issue of concern for many 
scholars. Is there any lesson that Taiwan can offer toward that end? What and how can 
China learn from Taiwan’s experience? We analyze these questions from three aspects:
(1) The system and nature of a party-state regime: 
Among countries democratized during the historical three waves of democratization, 
the former regimes are of three typical authoritarian types: one-party system, military-
dominated system, and dictatorship.59 During the early stages of Taiwan’s former rule by 
the Kuomintang party-state, all levels of government were controlled by party organiza-
tions; the military was controlled by political work sections dominated by the party; no so-
cial organization could avoid being monitored by party members; and any opposition party 
had to support the ruling party. The Kuomintang applied the varnish of “democratic consti-
tutionalism” simply to maintain some legitimacy, and its relations with the United States. 
Moreover, the nature of the quasi-Leninist Kuomintang regime was different from the 
Leninist party-state system of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).60 The Kuomintang 
did not embrace dictatorship of the proletariat and did not purport to maintain exclusive 
political power forever. Kuomintang ideology held that Taiwan should ultimately trans-
form from civil dictatorship to democracy, and all ruling behaviors were to be accord-
ingly limited in scope. On the contrary, the CCP not only decided the nature and goals of 
the country by following its ideology, but also regarded democratic parties that opposed 
communism as disloyal rebels. The CCP controlled every aspect of people’s lives, and 
completely abided by the course of the dictatorship of proletariat and socialism. 
The CCP decided in its Sixteenth National People’s Congress, in 2002, to accept 
capitalist class members, and boldly announced that the old Chinese Communist Party 
based on the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism had been replaced by a new CCP that bore 
increased resemblance with the Social Democratic Party or People’s Party.61 This was 
a CCP effort to solve a legitimacy crisis, but in fact, the nature of its one-party authori-
tarian system did not change, and it did not allow for any challenge from any quarter.
(2) Local autonomy and elections:
58  The National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 16. Tiananmen Square, 
1989: The Declassified History, [Online, cited 18 August 2005].  Available from  <http://www.
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59 Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 110-113.
60 Tun-Jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, “Taiwan in Transition,” Journal of Democracy, 
vol. 1, no. 2 (April 1990), pp. 64-65; and Tun-Jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, “Regime 
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Stephan Haggard, Political Change in Taiwan (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), pp. 6-7.
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Although Taiwan did not have any practical experience of democratic systems in 
its central government, election of local officials had long been usual procedure. The 
experience of such local autonomy and regular elections not only laid the foundation 
for Taiwan’s democratization, it also accelerated the progress of democratization once 
it began in the 1980s.62 Open and competitive elections provided opportunity for op-
position parties to grow in strength, and also allowed for perfection of election systems 
and procedures. As the populace increasingly saw itself as an electorate, open elections 
became the source of government legitimacy as well as the most efficient means for 
realizing democratic politics. 
Although Taiwan’s early local elections, held in the 1950s, were conceived by the 
Kuomintang as a means for reinforcing its legitimacy, the Kuomintang began to think 
over the issue of political democratization after the Kaohsiung Incident in 1978, when 
several candidates who had been imprisoned in the Kaohsiung Incident won election as 
representatives in the central government. Consequently, then president Chiang Ching-
Kuo declared the abolition of Martial Law and lifted prohibitions against political par-
ties and newspapers. The subsequent president, Lee Teng-hui, then planned and imple-
mented regular, open, fair, and free national elections.63 
On the other hand, the CCP only allows grass roots autonomy in rural regions, and holds 
elections in some villages. In fact, the village elections are elections in name only and they 
would not proceed except for pressure from higher authorities.64 Due to the lack of real local 
autonomy, and inexperience with election systems, Chinese leaders have no basis of experi-
ence for understanding the value of free democracy in government. From Mao Zedong to 
Jiang Zemin, CCP leaders have been unwilling to think about political democratization.65 
(3) Economic development and political leadership:
Huntington argued that “economic development would lead to democracy; political 
leadership realizes democracy.” Political elites in a prospective democracy must have 
the faith that democracy is not the worst form of governance.66 Political leaders try to 
establish democracy because they believe that democracy itself is not only the final 
goal, but also the means to achieve other goals. 
With regard to economic development, many foreign scholars viewed Taiwan’s 
performance as an “economic miracle.” Taiwan’s government not only led its people 
to overcome the oil crisis and global economic recession of the 1970s and 1980s, but 
Taiwan’s economic development continued apace.67 The Kuomintang government 
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boasted that Taiwan’s experience could be seen as an example for developing coun-
tries including China. 
In order to deal with some external crises (loss of UN membership and loss of 
diplomatic relations with the United States) and strengthen citizen confidence in 
Taiwan’s future, the central government initiated many large-scale public works 
and investments in heavy industry. Subsequently, because economic development 
had reached a point where people began to ask for more political participation, the 
government was forced to seek a path toward liberal democratization. On the con-
trary, the Chinese Communist Party adopted socialism, which emphasized public 
ownership. However, in order to make a shift from military strategy to economic 
strategy, China had to open its market to the world. Although economic develop-
ment in China holds much promise, rapid economic growth also leads to tensions 
and instability, and it results that some domestic social groups advocate more 
rapid reform in the political system. These are challenges that Chinese leaders 
have to face.68 According to Huntington’s theory, even given success in its eco-
nomic development, China’s progress toward democratization would still depend 
on “political leadership.”
Although China has been willing to open its markets to the world, its closed politi-
cal system sooner or later will lead to severe contradictions and conflicts. Although 
Taiwan has become a paragon of the third wave of democratization, so long as China’s 
ideology of authoritarianism remains unchanged there is little that Taiwan can do 
to foster democratization in China; Huntington’s arguments suggest that Taiwan 
can only hope and wait for that democratization. The unchanging preoccupation of 
Chinese leaders with maintenance of the Communist autocracy, and their predisposi-
tion to use force in dealing with reform movements among intellectuals and students, 
as well as the middle class, indicate that the prospect of China’s democratization is 
still bleak.69 
Bruce Gilley, who lived in China and Hong Kong for more than a decade, predicts 
that an elite-led transformation rather than a popularly led overthrow will take place 
in China. However, he also found that it is impossible to predict when such progress 
toward democratization will happen.70 For intellectuals in China, the question whether 
to pursue democratization is not as urgent as the matter of reckoning with the dangers 
that would inhere in the process of democratization.
For Chinese scholars, democratization is desirable, but also risky.71 Even if China 
were to progress toward democracy, it is unlikely that a newly democratic China 
could develop and maintain successfully. Reverses could lead to regional wars.72 
Democratization in China would be risky, rugged, and circuitous.
VI. Conclusion: The Prospect of Peace in the Taiwan Strait
The most influential and inspirational trend in this age of globalization is the wave 
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of democratization. The issues of democratization are subjects of hot debate among 
political scientists. While the global wave of democratization holds much hope, it is 
still too soon to discern whether cross-strait relations will lead to peace or war. We can 
analyze this issue from two standpoints:
1. Having successfully completed the transformation from an authoritarian regime to 
a stable democratic system, Taiwan is already regarded as a liberal democracy. As a 
democracy, it is not impossible that Taiwan, would make war against non-democra-
cies, but war against other democracies is most unlikely. In fact, there is a comple-
mentation effect between democracy and peace, and historical experience bears out 
the proposition that war between democracies is unlikely.73 Barring a future reverse 
or collapse of democracy in Taiwan, it is most unlikely that Taiwan would wage war 
against other countries. A stable and consolidated democracy has little probability 
of attacking other countries.
2. On the contrary, according to criteria adopted by Freedom House to judge the extent 
of democratization, the PRC government does not have the legitimacy that is provided 
by free and open elections. Freedom House regards China as a “Not Free” country 
which provides no guarantee or protection for people’s fundamental political rights 
or basic civil liberties. There is no sign of democratization in China.74 The authoritar-
ian Beijing regime not only suppresses all opposition voices by violent means, it also 
rejects free news media and an independent legal system. All manners of repression 
are used to control the populace. This causes some worry and concern among China’s 
neighboring countries, including the fear of war in East Asia. If China begins to move 
toward democratization, it is not unlikely that there will be instability and power 
struggles during the process. Such instability and tensions during transition between 
different political regimes, together with the probable mobilization of nationalism, 
increase the probability of China making war against other countries.
Two important observations may be drawn from the present work. Firstly, countries 
experiencing democratic transition are more likely even than authoritarian countries to 
make war against their neighbors. The theory of democratic peace only applies when 
democratizing countries reach the phase of democratic consolidation. Secondly, the 
process of democratization does not unavoidably cause wars, but the chance of hostile 
outbreaks increases if the democratization process is unsteady. Countries which have 
stable and consolidated democratic systems will not fight with each other. 
The prospect for peaceful relations across the Taiwan Strait not only depends on 
Taiwan’s determination to maintain its democratic system and move steadily toward 
democratic consolidation, it also depends on China’s willingness to begin the process 
of democratization and to move steadily toward democratic consolidation with help 
from the international community. It is obvious that such moves are not contemplated 
by China’s political leadership, and therefore the possibility of war across the Taiwan 
Strait remains unchanged, and is unlikely to change any time soon. 
Some scholars argue that so long as China remains engaged in doing business with 
Western democracies, China’s democratization will happen naturally. Prosperous and 
stable economic relations might provide the inducement for the start of democratization 
in China, and in the long term, that would increase the prospect of peace. But the inter-
national community should do more to decrease the probability of reverses and crises 
during China’s future democratic transition. Beginning the so-called fourth wave of 
73 Sorensen, Democracy and Democratization, pp. 97-101.
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democratization in China, following its rapid economic development, is an imperative 
and a test for all Chinese people.
Taiwan has now only passed the first half of the “two-turnover test” and has not 
yet completed its democratic consolidation stage. Taiwan is therefore not yet counted 
as an advanced democracy. If Taiwan were to consolidate its democracy and become 
more liberal, many Western countries would more carefully scrutinize China’s policies 
regarding the “Taiwan issue.” As regards the question whether Taiwan would unify 
with China, neither the United States nor China has the authority to decide. Only the 23 
million people of Taiwan may make that decision, and their will should be respected. 
Only democracy can protect the freedom and human rights of the people of Taiwan. 
Security in East Asia will be assured only after China begins its democratization. 
Lasting peace in the Taiwan Strait will be realized only when China’s democratiza-
tion proceeds steadily and smoothly. The international community should therefore 
be attentive and ready to provide all necessary help to realize the initiation and steady 
progress of China’s democratization. 
